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What’s So Artificial and Intelligent
about Artificial Intelligence?
A Conceptual Framework for AI
Rebekah L. H. Rice
There is currently a good deal of attention being focused on artificial intelligence, broadly speaking, and deep learning, specifically. The attention is
warranted, as these technologies are predicted to affect our collective lives
in innumerable ways even beyond their already expansive social reach.
There is much to consider regarding the benefits and potential harms of
AI. And of course there are the apocalyptic musings about super-intelligent
machines running amok, bringing science fiction scenarios uncomfortably
close to anticipated reality. But productively engaging in discussions about
the ethical and social implications of AI, and about which sorts of futures it
is reasonable to anticipate, requires clarity about certain key concepts at play
in these conversations. Some of these are conspicuous: artificial and intelligence, notably. The former suggests a contrast with some other concept. But
which, exactly? Natural, perhaps? Or organic? And intelligence, being as it is
regularly attributed to human persons, might suggest a fitting analogy with
intelligence as it occurs in you and me. But what is intelligence in humans?
Does it require a mind or a soul? Is it simply a corollary of electrical and
chemical processes in the human brain? Gaining clarity about the range
of meanings to which such terms refer—and familiarity with the relevant
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debates surrounding the various meanings—will provide the conceptual
framework necessary to better articulate the precise ethical and pragmatic
questions we think most important to our efforts to intentionally navigate
a world with AI.

I. THINKING MACHINES?
When mathematician Alan Turing published “Computing Machinery and
Intelligence” in 1950,1 logical positivism permeated the intellectual terrain.2 Central to logical positivism is the verifiability criterion of meaning.3
According to it, the content, or meaning, of any meaningful statement is
exhausted by the conditions that must be verified to obtain if the statement
is to be considered true. These verification conditions are either empirical
(synthetic) or logical (analytic). Those who held the view claimed that if a
statement cannot be verified using logic or empirical investigation, then it
is unverifiable and therefore meaningless (and not a candidate for truth).
Logical positivism ultimately fell out of favor given its implication that
many seemingly understandable statements about such topics as metaphysics and religion and political theory turn out to be meaningless. But even
more damning, the view’s central claim appears to fail to satisfy its own
criterion. After all, can the verifiability criterion of meaning itself be verified
in the manner required?
What is perhaps most illuminating about this intellectual movement
for our purposes, however, is the way in which the logical positivists traded
metaphysical questions for epistemological ones. Verifiability is an epistemic criterion. It has to do with what one can know, reasonably believe, or
demonstrate. And yet, might there be facts that obtain though no one does,
or perhaps can, come to know them? Take the claim that certain mathematical entities—sets, say—are real. Can this be verified empirically? Or can the
reality (or not) of sets be established via logical inference? It would seem
not. And yet it may nevertheless be that sets belong, as Bertrand Russell
contends, to “the world of being.”4 The relevance to Turing is evident when
one considers the question with which he begins his seminal paper and, correspondingly, the method he suggests for answering it. The paper sets out to
1. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 433–60.
2. See, e.g., Ayer, Logical Positivism; Carnap, “Elimination of Metaphysics.” For an
application to the mind, see Carnap, “Psychology in Physical Language,” in Ayer, Logical Positivism.
3. Correspondingly, there is also a verifiability criterion of truth.
4. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 91–100.
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answer the question, “Can machines think?”5 But rather than rehearse proposed definitions or catalog how the terms “machine” and “think” are used,
he proposes his now famous imitation game. Here’s how he describes it:
It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an
interrogator (C). . . . The interrogator stays in a room apart from
the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to
determine which of the other two is the man and which is the
woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and at the end of
the game he says either “X is A and Y is B” or “X is B and Y is
A.” The interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B. . . .
The ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter communicating
between the two rooms.6

The interrogator’s objective is to ask questions of A and B and then
determine, based on their respective answers, with whom he is communicating. It is A’s aim to mislead the interrogator and veer him toward an inaccurate identification, whereas B’s aim is to help the interrogator. But how, in
an imagined game such as this, do we make headway toward answering the
question about whether machines can think? Turing clarifies:
We now ask the question, “What will happen when a machine
takes the part of A in this game?” Will the interrogator decide
wrongly as often when the game is played like this as he does
when the game is played between a man and a woman?7

Now, instead of identifying which interlocutor is the man and which
the woman, the interrogator must determine when he is receiving responses
from a machine and when he is interacting with a human. Could the machine’s responses successfully imitate those of a human so that the interrogator believes he is communicating with a human person? If yes, then we
will thereby have an affirmative answer to the original question. In other
words, a machine that can perform certain kinds of tasks—in this case,
answering pointed questions—in a way that is indistinguishable from a human performing such tasks satisfies Turing’s criterion for a thinking thing.
Notice it is an observer’s ability with respect to distinguishing between the
two that establishes whether or not the thing is thinking.
Now, that may be well and good and we might think the substituted
questions adequate to the task of determining the status of such a machine.
But that will depend on what assumptions we are making. Importantly, the
5. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 433.
6. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 433.
7. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 434.
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original question is a metaphysical one. It asks whether reality is such that
there are, or could be, thinking machines. Or perhaps, more pointedly, it
asks about a certain category of items, namely machines, and whether they
are the sorts of entities capable of thinking. Now, such a question can be
answered in the manner suggested only if thinking is entirely a publicly
observable phenomenon. That is, only if thinking is entirely a matter of
certain inputs being followed by particular behavioral, or otherwise observable outputs, is the question about what the interrogator is able to observe
and conclude on the basis of such observation apt. If the observer compares
the behavioral outputs of the machine with those of the human and finds
them qualitatively indistinguishable, then just as the human is a thinking
thing (ex hypothesi), so is the machine. In other words, whether Turing’s
proposed method is capable of answering his original question depends on
what thinking is.
Indeed, the logical positivists who gave thought to the nature of the
mental opted for a version of behaviorism fittingly termed “logical behaviorism.” According to this view, “all sentences of psychology describe
physical occurrences, namely, the physical behavior of humans and other
animals.”8 The upshot is that any meaningful psychological statement, that
is, a statement purportedly describing a mental phenomenon, can be translated, without loss of content, into a statement solely about behavioral and
physical phenomena. Famously, Carl Hempel suggested that “Paul has a
toothache” can be translated into a sentence like, “Paul weeps and makes
gestures of such and such kinds.”9 The view is that psychological statements
ultimately reduce to mere “motions and noises.” Now, it’s not difficult to
appreciate the motivation for reducing psychology to behavior. Behavior,
as we’ve said, is publicly available for observation, whereas internal mental
states like pains, beliefs, and desires are not. As such, behavior can serve as
an intersubjective verifiability requirement. This facilitates something we
should want, namely, the ability for psychological statements to have public,
sharable meanings that serve as vehicles of interpersonal communication.
What’s more, a meaning’s being sharable is critical to our ability to analyze
it, make generalizations with respect to it across multiple subjects, and potentially treat psychological conditions. It is perhaps no accident that logical and other forms of behaviorism took root during the early part of the
twentieth century, rather immediately on the heels of the recent emergence
of psychology as a robust field of scientific inquiry and study.

8. Carnap, “Psychology in Physical Language,” 107.
9. Hempel, “Logical Analysis of Psychology, 17.
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It is helpful to note here that behaviors, which are by their very nature
observable and therefore useful because they are verifiable, are importantly
distinct from actions. A behavior is whatever people or organisms (or even
mechanical systems) do that is publicly observable. In humans, these can
include physiological reactions and responses (e.g., perspiration, salivation,
increased pulse rate), and bodily movements (e.g., raising an arm, flipping a
light switch, uttering a sentence). In a computing system, they might result
in digital outputs of various kinds. Actions, on the other hand, are behaviors
typically performed intentionally and for reasons. As such, they are mentally quite robust. To get a sense of the difference between the two, consider
Donald Davidson’s description of his morning’s events:
This morning I was awakened by the sound of someone practicing the violin. I dozed a bit, then got up, washed, shaved,
dressed, and went downstairs, turning off a light in the hall as I
passed. I poured myself some coffee, stumbling on the edge of
the dining room rug, and spilled my coffee fumbling for the New
York Times.10

Some of the events Davidson describes are actions. Others are mere behaviors—events that simply befall him. Among those belonging to the first
category are getting up, washing, shaving, and turning off the light. Those
belonging to the second category include being awakened, stumbling on the
rug, and spilling the coffee.
Consider the action of turning off the light. From the perspective of an
observer, the viewable bodily movement is a flipping of a switch. That movement is followed, presumably, by the room’s coming to no longer be illuminated. But what about this behavior makes it a turning-off-of-the-lights?
If Davidson had been mistaken about the purpose of the switch, he might
have flipped it intending to bring about some entirely different result—perhaps he’d intended to run the garbage disposal. So, at the time that he flips
the switch, we, as observers, can’t know what action Davidson takes himself
to be performing simply by observing his behavior. Or to put matters more
precisely, which action Davidson performs depends in part on his reasons
for performing it. Suppose I am walking back and forth from one end of the
room to the other. What am I doing? Am I pacing? Am I exercising? My legs
are moving so as to carry me from one location to another. But that doesn’t
settle what it is I’m doing—what action I am performing. What action I am
performing depends, in part, on why I am behaving as I am.
In the case of Davidson, to discover which action he is performing we
would need to know what it is he saw in acting—in this case, in flipping the
10. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, 43.
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switch—such that it seemed to him the thing to do. We would require access
to his reason or reasons for acting. Reasons and their ilk are mental items.
And unless mental items reduce entirely to bodily movements, or some
other publicly available phenomenon, it would seem that observation alone
cannot help us here. So, when it comes to “full-blooded actions,” of the sort
that humans (and perhaps members of some other species) regularly perform, it is arguable that a view like behaviorism is likely to fall short.11 And
this is because such actions involve a richer psychological structure than a
view like logical behaviorism can account for.
The insistence that all psychological items can be reduced to behaviors
marked a significant departure from the way psychological states were historically characterized. Following on a tradition heavily influenced by René
Descartes, William James states that “Psychology is the Science of Mental
Life, both of its phenomena and of their conditions. The phenomena are such
things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the
like.”12 Now, if the items of psychology are those James lists, then they are
distinctively mental items. Mental items are those that are available to their
subjects via introspection, such as the mood I’m now in. Or the thought
you’re now having. How do you and I come to know these things about
our respective inner mental lives? When literal descriptions fail, we turn to
metaphor. Introspection, we might say, is the exercise of turning one’s gaze
inward. It is direct and unmediated.13 Metaphors aside, one need simply attend to one’s own mental states, and voila! Introspection allows one to access
what is available from the first-person perspective. I cannot introspect and
hope to access your mental states, and neither can you so access mine.
Now imagine you wish to study the psychological items that James
describes. Because such items are available only from the first-person
perspective, it will be difficult indeed to draw conclusions about a broad
category of human psychology. Any inquiry I engage in will have a sample
size of one (me). That is hardly grounds for a reliable generalization! It is no
surprise, therefore, that some have wished to reduce psychological states to
behaviors, neurophysiological activity, and the like, being as these are occurrences observable from the third-person perspective. And as such, they
lend themselves nicely to serving as the subjects of scientific inquiry. But
can the mental be so reduced? Beliefs, desires, pains, perceptual states, and
11. The distinction between low-level activities (e.g., a spider that manipulates its
limbs so as to move across the floor) and full-blooded actions is found in Frankfurt,
“Problem of Action.”
12. James, Principles of Psychology, 1.
13. Notice that my access to your mental states is indirect and must be mediated by
your testimony or behavior.
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so on have long been characterized as items belonging to the mind—or, as
Descartes described it, to the part of a person that thinks.

II. MINDS AND BRAINS
Whether facts about human psychology ultimately reduce to physical
facts—about physical outputs like behaviors, or else those pertaining to
our underlying neurophysiology—is a question that has consumed philosophers of mind for a number of decades. Neuroscience tells us there is
a high degree of correlation between mental phenomena (beliefs, desires,
perceptions, sensations, intentions, and so on) and brain phenomena (neural events, chemical processes, and the like). Indeed, in many cases brain
science can tell us which mental states (or events) correlate with which
brain states (or events). Couple this with the fact that additional discoveries
are being made at a seemingly ceaseless pace, and it is natural to suppose
that we can eventually, with time, come to have an exhaustive list of such
correlations. In other words, the empirical data makes reasonable the belief
that for every mental state M, there is a physical correlate, P.14 Of course,
this acknowledgment won’t by itself reveal precisely how the mind relates
to the underlying physiology. But additional facts regarding the apparent
causal connections between the two may bolster the case. For example, we
know that if we increase the availability of certain chemicals in the brain
(e.g., serotonin), it will affect the subject’s mood. And we know that damage
to certain regions of the brain will result in memory loss, or impairment of
speech. So, the connection between the mental and the physical appears to
be quite tight—so tight, in fact, that many of the phenomena we once attributed to the mind are now routinely explained by appealing solely to goingson in the brain. It’s not an enormous leap to conclude, on this basis, that the
mental just is the physical, or, in any case, that it reduces to the physical, or
that it utterly depends, in some other way, on the physical. Indeed, it appears
to be a methodological assumption in some disciplines that if one cares to
understand the mind, the thing to do is to examine the brain.
Two broad views concerning the relationship between the mind (or
the mental) and the brain have emerged. They are substance dualism and
physicalism. The first has enjoyed lengthy historical prominence, only to be
surpassed in popularity by the second relatively recently. It is to these that
I now turn.
14. This chapter admittedly does a good deal of hand-waving with respect to the
neural correlates of mental states. For more, see Baker’s chapter in this book, “Reinforcement in the Information Revolution.”
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II.a. Substance Dualism
According to the substance dualist, every human person is composed of two
substances: a nonphysical mind (or soul), on the one hand, and a physical
body, on the other.15 The view is Platonic in its origins and received considerable development by Descartes. In Descartes’s view, while it’s true that I
have both a mind and a body, the thing I am—and that which accounts for
my continued existence over time—is my mind. As Descartes puts it, “But
what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has
sensory perceptions.”16 The mind, then, is the substance in which all of the
mental states and activities reside. From a Cartesian perspective, the mind
and the body causally interact, as when my feeling hungry causes me to
reach for the Cheetos, or when the tissue damage from a tumble off my bike
produces a pain sensation in me. This feature of Descartes’s view gave rise to
a challenge by one of his contemporaries, Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia, in
which she asked how it is that “the human soul can determine the movement
of the animal spirits in the body so as to perform voluntary acts—being as
it is merely a conscious (pensante) substance.”17 What Elizabeth seems to be
pointing to is the inadequacy of the sort of mechanistic view of causation
that (it would have been thought at the time) appears to account fairly well
for physical-to-physical causation to account for mental-to-physical causation. And she wonders whether Descartes can offer an alternative given that
he countenances mind-body causal interaction. As it turns out, Descartes
cannot, and the mind-body problem has come to plague the sort of dualism
Descartes defended ever since.
Just what “problem” the mind-body problem exposes for substance
dualism remains a topic of dispute among philosophers. In particular, philosophers disagree about whether it reveals a deep incoherence in the very
idea of mind-body causal interaction. But there’s no question that substance
dualism has fallen out of favor in philosophical circles. Interestingly, Elizabeth herself claims that she “could more readily allow that the soul has matter and extension than that an immaterial being has the capacity of moving
a body and being affected by it.”18 She would sooner abandon dualism in favor of physicalism than attribute causal efficacy to an immaterial substance.
15. The terms mind and soul will be used interchangeably throughout to refer to a
nonphysical part of persons, if any there be.
16. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 83.
17. Descartes, Correspondence with Princess Elizabeth, 53.
18. Descartes, Correspondence with Princess Elizabeth, 55.
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Replying to the mind-body problem became a central task of Cartesians in the years following Descartes. And while it would be an error to
minimize the role the problem played in whittling away at enthusiasm for
the view, dualism was more likely eclipsed by physicalist theories over the
course of the last century for empirical reasons. It is the demonstrably tight
connection between the mental and the physical that rendered a view committed to the independence of my mind and my body (Descartes imagined
it possible for me to exist without my body) untenable. And it is the ability to supplant previous appeals to an immaterial soul with explanations in
terms of brain functioning that has boosted the plausibility of a physicalist
alternative.

II.b. Physicalism
The majority of contemporary philosophers today are physicalists. The
same is true of a good number of biologists, physicists, psychologists, and
neuroscientists, as well, I understand, as a growing number of theologians.19
Physicalists believe that human beings, like you and me, are composed entirely (and only) of physical stuff. The implication, of course, is that, contrary
to what Descartes and Plato thought, you and I are neither wholly nor partly
constituted by an immaterial soul. Instead, I just am my body. Or, perhaps
more accurately, I am some part of my body, most probably some part of
my brain or central nervous system. Consider a particular human person,
Vanessa. If physicalism is correct, then Vanessa is through and through a
material, or physical, entity. Now, it won’t do to insist that Vanessa is identical to her whole body, since some parts of Vanessa’s body could go missing
(she could lose an arm in an unfortunate accident, for example) and Vanessa would nevertheless continue to exist. Suppose Vanessa is to undergo a
radical transplantation surgery in which a significant number of her critical
organs—her heart, lungs, liver, and kidneys, say—are to be switched out for
new ones. I suspect Vanessa will be quite nervous about the upcoming surgery, but it’s unlikely she will wonder who will exit the operating room upon
the surgery’s completion. Of course it will be Vanessa because none of those
particular organs are essential to her being Vanessa. On the other hand,
imagine Vanessa is instead facing a brain transplantation surgery in which
19. N. T. Wright puts his own view this way in “Mind, Spirit, Soul, and Body”: “Just
as I believe that we are wrong to look for a god-of-the-gaps, hiding somewhere in the
unexplored reaches of quantum physics like a rare mammal lurking deep in the unexplored Amazon jungle, so I believe we are wrong to look for a soul-of-the-gaps, hiding
in the bits that neuroscience hasn’t yet managed to explain.”
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the surgeon will remove her brain and replace it with someone else’s. Now
it would seem reasonable for Vanessa to be quite concerned about just who
will be wheeled out of the operating room. All of this is simply to suggest
that if we are physical things, likely some parts or features will matter more
than others. Some physicalists deny this. They claim instead that Vanessa is
not identical to her brain (or any part of her body), but to a living organism.20 Living organisms routinely lose bits (by, say, shedding skin cells) and
acquire new ones, assimilating them into the complex system in a way that
preserves the organism’s existence, provided the replacement occurs gradually. But as these considerations regard a person’s persistence over time, we
needn’t settle them here. What is central to the current discussion is that
a physicalist, of any variety, claims that human persons are identical to an
entity that is physical through and through.
Physicalism comes in a couple of forms. Reductive physicalists maintain that a person’s mental life (i.e., her beliefs, desires, intentions, emotional
states, and so on) is wholly reducible to neural events and chemical processes in her brain. The upshot is that there’s nothing distinctive or special about
the mental. The mental just is the physical. One concern about reductive
physicalism is that it appears to be incompatible with the thesis that human
beings sometimes act freely. After all, reductive physicalism implies that
everything I do is caused by neural events in me. Suppose I raise my hand
because I wish to hail a taxi. According to reductive physicalism, my hand’s
rising is not caused by my desire (to hail a cab), but rather by some neural
event which sends a signal (ultimately) to my limb. But neural events, like
all physical events, are governed by physical laws. And which physical laws
there are, and whether they hold, are not matters that are up to me. So, it
seems that my actions are not up to me.21
Nonreductive physicalists maintain, like their reductionistic counterparts, that there are only physical substances and that I am one such. But
they deny that mental states can be reduced to brain states. That’s because a
belief, for example, cannot be wholly described, without loss of meaning, in
purely physical terms. Among other things, beliefs have intentional content.
They are “about” something. Take, for example, my belief that Seattle is in
the state of Washington. My belief is about Seattle. But the corresponding
neural event (whatever that may be) is not about anything at all; it is merely
a biological state. And the same is true of desires, intentions, and perceptual
states. The mental is anomalous—truly unique and irreducible. Notably,
20. See, e.g., van Inwagen, Material Beings; Olson, Human Animal; Merricks, “Resurrection of the Body.”
21. An astute reader will note that free will is precluded on this picture only if free
will is incompatible with determinism.
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these mental items inhere in, or are states of, the physical item (the body).22
In this way, nonreductive physicalists deny the substance dualist’s insistence
that mental items must inhere in a mental substance (the mind).
To avoid reduction, nonreductive physicalists characterize the relationship between the mental and the physical in a way that upholds a dependence of the former on the latter, but which avoids identity. The options
are rather abundant, as several such relations have been proposed.23 One
way to unpack this dependence is in terms of supervenience. There are several versions of supervenience on offer, but for our purposes it will do to
express the idea in terms of the well-known maxim, “no mental difference
without a physical difference.” In other words, if x and y are in every way
alike physically, then they are in every way alike mentally. Importantly, the
sort of dependence envisaged here is asymmetric (the mental is dependent
on the physical, but the physical is not similarly dependent on the mental).
An attractive feature of nonreductive physicalism is that it preserves
our understanding of action. For nonreductive physicalists, the mental
is causally efficacious and able to bring about the bodily movements that
count as our actions. Whereas the reductive physicalist will reduce the causal efficacy of the mental to physical causal relations at the subvenient base,
nonreductive physicalists claim that the mental is itself causal. My running
really is caused by my seeming to see a lion, and your eating the chocolate is
indeed brought about by your desire to do so. But can the nonreductionist
help herself to mental causation? A well-rehearsed argument, known as the
“Exclusion Argument,” suggests not.
Jaegwon Kim articulates the argument this way. Begin with a metaphysical doctrine likely to garner sympathy from any physicalist: the causal
closure of the physical domain (or “closure principle,” for short).
Closure Principle: If a physical event has a cause at time t, it has
a sufficient physical cause at t.24

In searching for causes of physical events, we never need venture beyond the realm of the physical.25 As Kim puts it, “the physical domain is
22. A closely related view which characterizes these irreducible mental items as
properties (rather than states or events), but nevertheless denies the existence of a
mental substance, is property dualism.
23. Proposed relations include (but are not limited to) constitution, emergence,
realization, and supervenience.
24. Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 214.
25. Indeed, Kim goes on to say that “if closure fails, theoretical physics would be
in principle incompletable” and that “it seems clear that research programs in physics,
and the rest of the physical sciences, presuppose something like the closure principle.”
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causally, and hence explanatorily, self-sufficient and self-contained.”26 Suppose, as our above story about action implies, that a mental event, m, causes
a physical event, p. It follows from this and the closure principle that there
is also a physical event, call it p*, occurring at the same time as m that is a
cause of p. To preserve nonreduction and hence the causal efficacy of the
mental event m, we will need to posit that m is not identical to p*. But now
we have two purported causes of p: m and p*. Unless this is a genuine case
of overdetermination, it would seem that p leaves little (i.e., no) work for
m to do. Indeed, as Kim puts it, “No event has two or more distinct sufficient causes, all occurring at the same time, unless it is a genuine case of
overdetermination.”27
Genuine cases of overdetermination occur when two independent
causal chains converge at a single effect as when a house fire is caused by
a short circuit and a lightning strike simultaneously, or when two bullets
hit a person at the same time, either of which would have been sufficient
to kill him. We can allow for some causal overdetermination (surely such
occurrences can happen), but one would expect them to be rare. However, if
every case of mental-to-physical causation involves (at least) two sufficient
causes, then every case in which I act will be a case of overdetermination.
Now multiply this by all actions performed by persons at any time in history
and the overdetermination will be very widespread indeed!28
Embracing this result renders mental states epiphenomenal, or causally inert, and undercuts the familiar account of action with which we began. To vindicate m as a genuine cause of p, m should be able to bring about
p without there being a synchronous p*. But in any version of physicalism,
every mental event has a physical causal partner (or correlate) that would
have brought about the effect, even if m had not.
Kim takes the lesson of the exclusion argument to be that, insofar as
we wish to preserve mental causation, we must reduce m to p*. Our understanding of agency can be maintained with the proviso that it is not my
belief, desire, or intention, but rather the respective state’s physical substrate (or realizer, if you prefer), which causes the bodily movement that
constitutes my action. Actions therefore involve physical causal sequences
through and through. The upshot is to deny that the mental is something
Philosophy of Mind, 215.
26. Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 214.
27. Kim, Philosophy of Mind, 216.
28. Some have argued that the variety of overdetermination involved in cases of
mental causation are innocuous. See Bennett, “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable”; “Exclusion Again”; Sider, “What’s so Bad about Overdetermination?”
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over and above the physical. Or, put differently, if one is a physicalist, then
one should be a reductive physicalist.
Much ink has been spilled over the last two decades in efforts to reply
to the exclusion argument and preserve mental causation. These attempts
take us too far afield form our present purpose to warrant explication here.
Suffice it to say that there is likely no view about the nature of the mind that
comes free of cost. As they say, there are no free lunches. And yet one of
these, broadly construed, is likely (roughly) correct. It is not my aim to argue for one over the others. But which view one leans toward will determine
how one thinks about the possibility of thinking machines—or thinking
things of any kind.

III. MINDS AND MACHINES
In this final section, I want to draw out some implications of what has thus
far been said for certain questions we might have with regard to AI. Naturally, this is not an exhaustive set of questions. And I don’t profess to provide
answers. Instead, I take the following (admittedly brief) discussion to be
instructive for thinking about how to go about answering some of the vexing questions that arise with respect to artificial intelligence.
Let’s begin by returning to Turing’s original question: Can machines
think? In short, I suppose it depends on what one means by “think.” Since
Descartes, thinking has been understood as the defining feature of the mental. Now, if mental items are wholly reducible to neuronal occurrences, then
the matter becomes largely an empirical one. The same is true if mentality
reduces to behavior. Both nonreductive and dualistic theories deny the reducibility of mental items and accordingly will insist on conditions that are
not available from the third-person perspective but are instead phenomenal,
or else that depend on the presence of states with certain sorts of content, as
in the case of beliefs, desires, and the like.
Now, I concede that I’ve taken a rather narrow path to understanding
the intelligence component of artificial intelligence. Of course, a great many
things can be meant by “intelligence.” I have focused on thinking, much
as Turing did. But other concepts like processing, learning, understanding,
and inferring may also be relevant. I don’t have space to attend to each of
these here. This is likely no great loss since the phrase “artificial intelligence”
has largely been deemed imperfect from the outset and demonstrably overreaches the sorts of actual technological developments thought to fall under
its umbrella. Most of these have specific and more fitting names—for example, machine learning, symbolic systems, big data, supervised learning,
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and neural networks. That said, I am less concerned here with the precise
technologies than I am with the ambitious questions that have occupied
many thinkers when they’ve sought to imagine what might be possible.
And this brings us to the matter of artificiality. This too might have
several meanings. I deem a comparison with grand concepts like natural to
prove fruitless since it is notoriously difficult to define what is and isn’t natural in a way that renders intuitive results (by including the right things and
excluding all the others). But here’s a way of getting at the sort of question I
take many to have when they think about thinking machines. Let’s first take
a detour back to mental phenomena. Mental states are often thought to be
multiply realizable. Consider pain, for example. Pain in humans supervenes
on (or perhaps it is identical to) certain processes that occur in the human
brain. But octopus pain—a phenomenon I have every reason to believe is
quite real—is realized by drastically different physical occurrences (owing
to its different physiology). Moreover, if one thinks it coherent to imagine
an extraterrestrial being with an altogether unique underlying physical
structure to anything found on earth nevertheless experiencing pain, then
pain is a concept that is definable independently of the structure that realizes it. Perhaps other mental states—even thinking—are like this. But, then,
that’s precisely what is at issue in the various theories about the metaphysics
of mind we’ve considered.
But now we might wonder whether the examples we’ve so far given
bear something essential in common. Is it relevant that extraterrestrials and
octopuses and humans are composed of material stuff that cannot be produced in a lab or a factory? It’s not obvious why it should be. Just as we are
wont to ask upon which biological structures mentality might supervene,
we may also ask whether mentality can supervene on synthetic structures.
To answer in the affirmative is to carve out a metaphysical possibility. It is
not to commit ourselves to a view about the physical possibility of such an
occurrence nor, certainly, is it to stake a claim with respect to how close
technological advances are to actualizing this possibility. Interestingly, it
isn’t even to articulate an account of what an underlying structure must be
like to give rise to mentality. It is to do something quite different. It is to
start with the mental. It is to ask what mentality is. What does it require?
And what, precisely, is the relationship between it and the physical? It likely
won’t come as a surprise that these are deep philosophical questions about
the metaphysics of mind. And while I believe we can make progress with
respect to them, they will undoubtedly remain perennial questions.
In the interim, here is a strategy we might employ: At the very least,
let’s begin by making our assumptions about the mind explicit. If, in your
view, thinking requires an immaterial soul, then only entities to which
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such an item can be attached (or from which such an item can emerge) will
make the cut. If, on the other hand, you believe that mentality depends on
physicality, then how so? Does the former reduce to latter, or does it merely
supervene on it? Once these commitments are front and center, we can have
a robust conversation regarding what sorts of entities are capable of satisfying the conditions of mentality. But if these presuppositions are allowed to
lurk in the background and out of plain view, we will almost certainly talk
past one another.
The downsides to this are quite real. Could we create a machine such
that powering it off would be immoral? The moral requirements with respect to the proper treatment of a being depend rather significantly on what
sorts of experiences it can have. My children’s first pet was a betta fish. It
once (quite unintentionally) went unfed for a staggering nine days. How
egregious a moral failure this was depends, in part, on the extent to which
the lack of food caused the fish to suffer. Even if it had died (it didn’t), the
loss of life wouldn’t necessarily, all by itself, have constituted a moral failure.
I’ve killed many a house plant by not watering it. Few will contend that killing a plant is immoral. Now, I’m fairly confident that betta fish have rather
limited sets of experiences. A dog would have fared much worse and undoubtedly would have suffered greatly, certainly enough to make the omission morally unconscionable. (This is precisely why a fish makes a better
pet for busy households with young children and preoccupied parents than
does a dog.) It is also why we (properly) feel less remorse when squishing a
spider than we do harming a cat. Of course, we could be wrong about what
sorts of mental states a thing enjoys and thereby be incorrect in our moral
assessments. Regardless, the metaphysical facts ground the truth of the relevant moral claims. As such, the metaphysics ought not be ignored—and we
can begin by being transparent about what metaphysical presuppositions
we bring to the relevant discussions.
I’ll conclude with a final matter of importance. When the topic of the
possibility of thinking machines arises, many begin to wonder if there is
something distinctive, and important, about humans such that our unique
value is not undermined by the presence of machinery capable of completing many of our tasks and endowed with the ability to think and have
experiences. Christian theists, in particular, are apt to worry about the
doctrine of imago Dei, according to which human persons (or so it’s often
understood) bear the image of the divine. This has sometimes led theists
to view an immaterial soul as a particularly attractive feature by which to
mark a human person. This is too quick. First, it’s not at all clear that the
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imago Dei doctrine is best understood ontologically.29 Second, if an immaterial soul is the substance that underlies all mental states, then anything
exhibiting mentality will ex hypothesi have a soul. But now the motivation
for the original appeal to the soul—that it secures the distinctness of human
persons—has vanished.
It’s also noteworthy that within Christianity there is robust debate
about whether substance dualism is a view properly understood to be
suggested by Scripture and creedal doctrine, or is instead a product of
philosophical (notably, Platonic) influence.30 Christians, and indeed theists generally, might find dualism less objectionable than their nontheistic
counterparts given their view that God created, and continually interacts
with, the physical universe. In this way, they already allow for instances of
nonphysical-to-physical causation. It is perhaps largely for this reason that
Christian physicalists have not tended to list the mind-body problem among
their primary motivations for denying dualism and adopting physicalism.
Even so, a growing number of Christian philosophers and theologians reject
substance dualism.31 And so it would not be accurate to regard an appeal
to the soul as the distinguishing mark of a human person as an essential
Christian commitment.
Theistic views aside, a being’s value needn’t depend on its status as
ontologically or phenomenologically distinct from other existent beings or
entities. And while it may be true for any entity that it either has mental
states or lacks them (dolphins have them, flower pots lack them), beings
that have mental states can differ from one another considerably (the inner
mental life of a dolphin is likely quite different from that of a bat). Were we
to discover thinking extraterrestrials, it wouldn’t thereby follow that human
mental phenomena would in any way be diminished. Nor would this be true
were it to turn out to be possible for certain synthetic structures to manifest
thought. Such considerations are worth bearing in mind as we consider the
question about wherein mentality can reside.

29. For an alternative conception of the doctrine, see De Cruz and Smedt, “Imago
Dei as a Work in Progress.”
30. For a range of views on this topic, see Murphy, Bodies and Souls; Wright, “Mind,
Spirit, Soul, and Body”; Rickabaugh, “Dismantling Bodily Resurrections Objections to
Mind-Body Dualism”; Lugioyo, “Whose Interpretation? Which Anthropology?” and
Cooper, “OK, But Whose Misunderstanding,” in Crisp et al., Neuroscience and the Soul.
31. Notable examples include Baker, Persons and Bodies; Corcoran, Rethinking
Human Nature; Merricks, “Resurrection of the Body”; Murphy, Bodies and Souls;
O’Connor, Persons and Causes; van Inwagen, Material Beings.
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